In Plutocracy We Trust
(Part Two)

In our last post, we asked the question whether the 2024 US Presidential election was a free and fair one. Part one of that post concluded that it was likely not free, in light of : (1) the undue influence, undue pressure and/or coercion routinely applied at the psychologically non-rational level to users by social media platforms; (2) the owner of one such platform, also the world’s richest man, fervently supporting one candidate over the other; and (3) the strange incident of the AmericaPAC ‘petition’ aimed at swing state voters only.

Here, in part two, we will consider how fair the 2024 US Presidential election was. The short answer is: not very, based on the limited, relevant, public information presently available.

From the last post, we can recall that fairness concerns the wider conditions in which an election takes place; fairness requires them to be equal. If freedom focuses on an individual voter’s personal state, circumstances, and opportunity, then fairness is about everything else – namely, the levelness of the playing field on which the candidates are competing. As mentioned in our last post, Elklit and Svensson (1997) conceive of fairness as impartiality, involving:

“both regularity (the unbiased application of rules) and reasonableness (the not-too-unequal distribution of relevant resources among competitors.” 1

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE’s) Election Observation Handbook (2010) describes a fair election as follows:

“Equal conditions should be ensured for all participants in the election process…The legal framework should reflect OSCE commitments and other international standards, and election legislation should be implemented fairly and impartially. All election contestants who wish to run for office should be able to do so and to compete on the basis of equal and impartial treatment under the law and by the authorities. Candidates and political parties should have unimpeded access to the media on a non-discriminatory basis, and state or public media should meet their special responsibility for providing sufficient, balanced and impartial information to enable the electorate to make well-informed choices. Campaign finance regulations should not favour or discriminate against any particular party or candidate. There should be a clear separation between state and party, and public resources should not be used unfairly for the benefit of any candidate or parties.

The election administration at all levels should act in a professional, efficient and unbiased manner. The voting, counting and tabulation processes should be free from fraud or manipulation to ensure that the will of voters is reflected through the election results. Candidates, parties and voters should have access to prompt and effective redress, including through an independent judiciary. Those responsible for violations of law should be held accountable in a timely manner. Candidates who receive the required number of votes to be elected should be duly installed in office.” 2

While many of these conditions have been discussed in the context of US politics over a long period, we shall limit our focus to the following:

(1) The very unequal distribution of media resources between the Democratic and Republican competitors

The Republican candidate enjoyed strong, public backing from the owner of X/Twitter; there was simply no equivalent, or anything remotely similar, on the Democratic side.3 For any social media campaigning, the latter would have to raise the funds to pay the various platforms for the privilege, and trust the platforms’ algorithms to deliver the desired results. By contrast, the Republicans had as a key ally the man with: (1) final control over the algorithms at one major platform; (2) his own personal following on that platform of 203 million followers;4 (3) his own pro-Trump superPAC; (3) and the power to outspend virtually any other individual on the planet on anything else remotely helpful to the cause. In these circumstances, the Republicans wouldn’t necessarily have to spend anything at all to ensure their candidate was promoted to the hilt – both via political microtargeting strategies and the owner’s own posts -among X/Twitter’s 106 million US-based users.

Analysis conducted by the Washington Post supports the outsized reach of the owner of X/Twitter on his own platform:

© Washington Post, 17 December 2024 5

In the same report, other analytics conducted by the newspaper led it to conclude the owner of X/Twitter “has a political megaphone unmatched in modern society”.6 Yes, X/Twitter is only one outlet across a varied online and traditional media landscape, but this level of impact – plus, even more crucially, ultimate control over the algorithms driving it – represents a huge communications advantage for the Republicans.

(2) “Unimpeded access to the media on a non-discriminatory basis”

A related issue concerns whether Harris enjoyed “unimpeded access” to X/Twitter “on a non-discriminatory basis”, as required by the OSCE. On the individual-to-individual level, it is difficult to imagine this condition was met, with X/Twitter’s owner so vehemently in support of the other side. On the technical level, does “unimpeded access to the media on a non-discriminatory basis” merely cover the candidate’s immediate relations with the media platforms/companies themselves – or would it also include access to media audiences/users as well? It’s an important question, given that research indicates that on X/Twitter, right-leaning news sources in the US are favoured by algorithmic amplification over left-leaning news sources.7 Right-leaning material has also been found to occupy a prominent spot on Facebook, with engagement on YouTube yielding more even results.8

(3) A legal framework reflecting “OSCE commitments and other international standards”

There is a whole host of OSCE commitments and international standards, but here we will focus on one significant commitment – international election observation – which was introduced at the top of Part One. As early as 1990, the then-CSCE9 stated that:

“The participating States consider that the presence of observers, both foreign and domestic, can enhance the electoral process for States in which elections are taking place. They therefore invite observers from any other CSCE participating States and any appropriate private institutions and organizations who may wish to do so to observe the course of their national election proceedings, to the extent permitted by law…” 10

This commitment has been reiterated by the US and other participating States in subsequent OSCE documents.11

Despite this longstanding commitment internationally, the policy and legislation of US election observation remain in the hands of individual states. Each has its own way of dealing with election observation, and with different types of observers. The result is a patchwork of permissions, prohibitions and limitations across the country, as the following image shows:12

With regard to the 2024 US Presidential election specifically, the Organization of American States’ (OAS’) Preliminary Report recognised “that the United States once again successfully organized a massive electoral process, which itself displayed the structure of checks and balances that is in place to safeguard its democratic system”.13 It also stated “the high level of political participation, with strong turnout rates and the dedicated work of thousands of election officials, poll workers, poll watchers and observers across the country, speaks to the vibrancy of the United States’ democracy”.14

Nevertheless, on election day, the OAS was only present in 13 states, plus the District of Columbia.15 One swing state (Pennsylvania) refused OAS presence outright.16 Another swing state (North Carolina) did not respond at all to the OAS’ request to observe.

This echoed the experience of the OSCE, which pointed out in its Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions:

“There is a legal prohibition of international election observation in 17 states and, in practice, in many other jurisdictions, contrary to the OSCE commitments. Several state election officials refused or ignored requests to meet with the ODIHR LEOM [the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Limited Election Observation Mission] observers due to perceived concerns over foreign interference.”17

OSCE requests to observe were declined or ignored in five of the swing states – Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Georgia, Wisconsin and Nevada – plus Alabama, Connecticut, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming.18 The ODIHR LEOM was comprised of 16 experts in Washington DC plus “64 long-term observers deployed throughout the country”.19 On election day itself, 250 OSCE-affiliated observers were posted, though no further details of their locations have been released yet.20

With such limited geographic coverage, the findings of the international election observation organisations vis-à-vis the 2024 US Presidential Election are, at best, a snapshot of what took place in certain corners of the country. In other parts, we are simply left to wonder how rules and processes were applied.21 This legal and practical state of affairs falls well below OSCE commitments relating to international election observation, which are meant to be reflected in OSCE states’ legal frameworks as part of achieving a fair election.

Conclusion

As demonstrated in Part One, there are very real reasons to challenge the idea that the 2024 US Presidential election was free. Here, in Part Two, the fairness of this election – in terms of the broader conditions in which it proceeded – is also challenged, on various grounds. First, the enthusiastic, public support the Republican candidate received from the owner of X/Twitter provided a unique and distinct advantage over other political rivals. The opportunity for cost-free, and supercharged, political microtargeting – plus posting bombardment from X/Twitter’s most followed account22 – was without parallel in the Democratic camp. Secondly, in these circumstances, how the Democratic party could possibly achieve unimpeded access to one major media outlet – namely, X/Twitter itself – “on a non-discriminatory basis” is hard to see. While the Democratic party may or may not have passed this threshold vis-à-vis traditional media outlets, the known algorithmic amplification of right-wing material on X/Twitter, but also on other social media platforms, is likely to have disadvantaged the Democratic party. Finally, we noted how legal frameworks reflecting OSCE commitments and other international standards also contribute to a fair election. By looking at one specific US example – namely, the US legal framework governing international election observation – the significant shortfall between US practices and US international commitments was revealed.

Taken together, these aspects of the 2024 US Presidential election suggest it was affected by a new type of unfairness, only made possible through the rise of billionaire social media platform owners; their direct, personal entry into the formal political process; and the unregulated tech capabilities on which their companies depend. These are all issues which require much more scrutiny and thought (both public and political), policy and legislation at the domestic level – and quickly. Only by generating greater public awareness, understanding and a sense of both urgency and agency over these matters can they be tackled effectively. It is in pursuit of this aim, amongst others, that this website hopes to make a valuable, if modest, contribution.

The US must succeed in developing and applying effective government strategies to address these new challenges to democracy. Requiring tech companies to provide access to their data, internal research and other products for university-accredited academics would be a good starting point. The creation of a standing government body staffed by specialists able to analyse the concept, design, implementation and operation of algorithms in the public interest is also desirable. (If that sounds unthinkable, keep in mind the EU already has one23). There is plenty that can be done, but without the political will to do so, good ideas will remain just that.

And without strenuous efforts to turn such ideas into reality, American politics will continue to be a case of ‘In Plutocracy We Trust’.

1J. Elklit and P. Svensson, ‘What Makes Elections Free and Fair?’ Journal of Democracy (1997) 8(3):32-46, p35. Emphasis in original. https://pure.au.dk/ws/files/104117297/Elklit_Svensson_8_3_1997_32_46.pdf
2OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Election Observation Handbook (6th ed)(2010), pp22-23. Emphasis added. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/5/e/68439.pdf
3While various celebrities, public office holders and other well-known people publicly declared their support for Harris, in general, the US’ billionaires were more circumspect about making their political preferences public: H. Marsden, ‘US Election: Who the Billionaires are Backing’ (1 November 2024) The Week https://theweek.com/politics/us-election-who-the-billionaires-are-backing . While, in private, both candidates received funding from billionaire donors, a September 2024 analysis by Bloomberg reported that more billionaire money had gone to Trump than Harris: K. Owram and B. Allison, ‘The Billionaire Backers’ (10 September 2024) Bloomberg https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2024-billionaire-donors-us-election/.
4K. Conger, ‘What Elon Musk Told his 203 Million X Followers on Election Day’ The New York Times (5 November 2024). https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/05/us/politics/elon-musk-trump-x-election-day.html
5J. B. Merrill, T. Thadani and K. Schaul, ‘Musk’s Influence on X Eclipses all Members of the Incoming Congress, Combined’ Washington Post (17 December 2024). https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/interactive/2024/see-how-elon-musks-online-audience-dwarfs-donald-trumps/
6J. B. Merrill, T. Thadani and K. Schaul, ‘Musk’s Influence on X Eclipses all Members of the Incoming Congress, Combined’ Washington Post (17 December 2024). https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/interactive/2024/see-how-elon-musks-online-audience-dwarfs-donald-trumps/
7F. Huszar, S. I. Ktena, C. O’Brien and M. Hardt, ‘Algorithmic Amplification of Politics on Twitter’ Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA (2022) 119 (1) e2025334119 https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2025334119 .Another study found “substantial amplification…for politically biased low-credibility tweets, especially those with right-leaning partisanship”: G. Corsi, ‘Evaluating Twitter’s Algorithmic Amplification of Low-Credibility Content: An Observational Study’ EPJ Data Science (2024) 13(8) https://epjdatascience.springeropen.com/articles/10.1140/epjds/s13688-024-00456-3 . This issue has also been covered in the media: D. Milmo, ‘Twitter Admits Bias in Algorithm for Rightwing Politicians and News Outlets’ The Guardian (22 October 2021). https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/oct/22/twitter-admits-bias-in-algorithm-for-rightwing-politicians-and-news-outlets
8P. M. Barrett and J. G. Sims, ‘False Accusation: The Unfounded Claim that Social Media Companies Censor Conservatives’ New York University/Stern Center for Business and Human Rights (February 2021), pp14-17. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5b6df958f8370af3217d4178/t/6011e68dec2c7013d3caf3cb/1611785871154/NYU+False+Accusation+report_FINAL.pdf
9Prior to 1995, the OSCE was known as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE): ‘CSCE Becomes OSCE’ (3 January 1995). https://www.osce.org/secretariat/52527
10OSCE ODIHR, Election Observation Handbook (6th ed)(2010), p101. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/5/e/68439.pdf
11See, for example, the Charter for European Security (1999), https://www.osce.org/mc/17502 ; and Brussels 2006 Decision No. 19/06, Strengthening the Effectiveness of the OSCE s2(10) https://www.osce.org/mc/23209 .
12Reproduced from ‘A Guide to Election Observer Policies in the United States’ The Carter Center (2017), p15. https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/democracy/cc-us-election-observation.pdf . At time of writing, this is the latest map available.
13Organization of American States, ‘Preliminary Report of the OAS Electoral Observation Mission for the General Elections of November 5, 2024, in the United States’ (8 November 2024), p2. https://www.oas.org/fpdb/press/USA24_Preliminary-Report_final.pdf
14Organization of American States, ‘Preliminary Report’ (8 November 2024), p1. https://www.oas.org/fpdb/press/USA24_Preliminary-Report_final.pdf
15Organization of American States, ‘Preliminary Report’ (8 November 2024), p1. https://www.oas.org/fpdb/press/USA24_Preliminary-Report_final.pdf
16West Virginia also refused: Organization of American States, ‘Preliminary Report’ (8 November 2024), p2. https://www.oas.org/fpdb/press/USA24_Preliminary-Report_final.pdf
17OSCE ODIHR and OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA), ‘International Election Observation Mission United States of America – General Elections, 5 November 2024: Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions’, p4. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/7/d/579931_0.pdf
18OSCE ODIHR and OSCE PA ‘Statement of Preliminary Findings’, p21. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/7/d/579931_0.pdf
19OSCE ODIHR and OSCE PA ‘Statement of Preliminary Findings’, p23. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/7/d/579931_0.pdf
20OSCE ODIHR and OSCE PA ‘Statement of Preliminary Findings’, p23. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/7/d/579931_0.pdf
21While other domestic election observer organisations exist,and observed the 2024 US Presidential Elections, these organisations can be partisan or nonpartisan. At time of writing ,one of the most well-known domestic nonpartisan organisations, the Carter Center, has not released any documents or statements concerning its observation of the 2024 US Presidential Election: ‘Center Prepares for 2024 US Election’ (1 July 2024) https://www.cartercenter.org/news/features/p/democracy/center-prepares-for-2024-us-election.html. While the Carter Center has been observing elections abroad since 1990, its first observation in the US was of a post-election audit in Georgia in 2020: ‘Waging Peace Through Elections: Elections Monitored by the Carter Center: 125 Elections Full and Limited in 40 Countries’ (updated 5 August 2024) https://www.cartercenter.org/peace/democracy/observed.html#elections.
22The Washington Post reports that: “in 26 days around the election, Musk fired off 3,870 posts that received more than 33 billion views”: J. B. Merrill, T. Thadani and K. Schaul, ‘Musk’s Influence on X Eclipses all Members of the Incoming Congress, Combined’ Washington Post (17 December 2024). https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/interactive/2024/see-how-elon-musks-online-audience-dwarfs-donald-trumps/
23The European Center for Algorithmic Transparency was established in 2023: https://algorithmic-transparency.ec.europa.eu/about_en.

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